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Abstract 
This paper analysis the link between political strength and public sector wages using a 
unique matched individual-employer data set for Norwegian local governments during 
the period 1990-1998. The results indicate that political strength, measured in several 
ways, has a positive effect on wages, while administrative strength, measured by the 
tenure of the chief executive, has a negative effect. The positive effect of political 
strength is consistent with a model in which the budgetary process is a multistage game 
and employment is determined in an interaction with interest groups prior to the wage 
bargain. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the relationship between wage setting and the political 
environment in the public sector. While there exists a large body of research linking 
wage outcomes in private firms to bargaining and efficiency wage models, surprisingly 
little work has been done to apply such models to understand wage outcomes in the 
public sector. Notable empirical exceptions are Inman (1981), Gyourko and Tracy 
(1991), Strøm (1995) and Falch and Rattsø (1999).1 One reason why bargaining models 
have been less popular in studies of labor markets in the public sector might be the 
absence of a well established and widely accepted theory of decision–making in public 
institutions similar to profit maximizing behavior in the private sector. While the 
median voter model has been popular as a description of public sector decision–making, 
this model fails to include important features of the public sector, such as interest group 
pressure and multidimensionality features. The aim of this paper is to provide some 
evidence on the wage determination process in a unionized public sector taking into 
account the role of political and budgetary constraints.  
 
A common belief is that politically weak governments, often associated with coalition 
governments, lead to higher public sector expenditure and lower budget surplus than 
politically strong governments as suggested in the seminal paper by Roubini and Sachs 
(1989). This hypothesis is also relevant in the local public sector, and the evidence 
indicates that more politically fragmented local councils lead to higher local public 
expenditure [Abrams and Dougan (1986), Bosch and Suarez-Pandiello (1995), Kalseth 
and Rattsø (1998)].2 The usual interpretation of these findings is that more powerful 
political entities are less vulnerable to interest group pressure than weak ones [Potters 
and Sloof (1996)]. 
 
The present paper departs from this literature in the following respects. First, while the 
                                                 
1 All these papers include both theoretical and empirical contributions. Theoretical papers on collective 
bargaining in the public sector include Holmlund (1993), Babcock et al. (1997), Strøm (1999) and Falch 
(2001). 
2 Allers et al. (2001), however, find that more fragmented local councils decrease local taxes in the 
Netherlands. 
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literature mostly considers the relationship between political strength and broad 
measures of economic outcomes, i.e. aggregate public expenditure, tax income and 
budget deficits, this paper focuses more narrowly on public sector wages. Second, we 
also allow the administrative leadership to have a separate role in the budgeting and 
wage bargaining processes.  
 
We present a theoretical model explicitly taking into account that the budgetary process 
may be a multistage game, with different decisions taken at different points in time. One 
main feature of the model is that the activity level in some parts of the local government 
is determined in an interaction with an interest group. Within this setup, the relationship 
between wages and political strength depends on the order of moves in the budgetary 
game. If wages are determined in the first stage of the game, wages are inversely related 
to political strength, consistent with the conventional view. However, if the activity 
level in the interest group sector is determined firstly, a positive relationship between 
wages and political strength may arise. When the strength of the political leadership is 
reduced, the activity level in parts of the local government increases, and within a given 
total budget, the resources available in the wage bargain is reduced. Because the wage 
bargain can be seen as dividing available resources between the bargaining parties, 
reduced political strength may for this reason reduce the bargained wage. Another 
prediction from the model is that if the administrative leadership is more involved in the 
wage setting process than in the interaction with interest groups, wages are likely to be 
negatively related to administrative strength.   
 
We estimate the relationship between wages, political and administrative strength, and 
other variables, using a matched employee-employer sample of Norwegian local 
governments for the period 1991-1998. The results clearly suggest that local public 
wages depend positively on political strength. On the other hand, administrative 
strength appears to have a negative effect on the wages. These results are quite robust 
across a range of different specifications of the model. Overall, the results are consistent 
with the model in which the activity levels in some sectors are determined prior to wage 
bargaining.  
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The rest of the paper goes as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model. Section 
3 gives a description of the institutional setup in the Norwegian local public sector and 
the data, while empirical results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains 
concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. A multistage budgeting and wage–setting model  
 
We present a stylized budgeting and wage-setting model to shed light on the link 
between political strength and public sector wages. Our modeling framework is 
motivated by the institutional setup in the Norwegian local public sector with a highly 
centralized fiscal system with very limited local discretion to set tax rates. Thus, the 
assumption of a fixed local government budget seems to be a good approximation to 
reality. This means that higher wages must be financed by redistribution of resources 
within the budget.  
 
The collective decisions in a situation with distributional conflict among interest groups 
are difficult to incorporate in a complete budgeting model.  Typically governmental 
decision–variables are determined at different stages. This could involve all types of 
decision–variables as labor input, non-labor input, wages and internal prices. The basic 
idea is that when some decision–variables for which interest group pressure may result 
in overspending are determined prior to wage determination, this reduces the money 
available at the wage setting stage. 
 
To proceed in a simple way, we will assume that the total budget R is divided between 
two activities. Assuming that employment L is the only input and that the wage w is 
equal for all employees, the budget constraint of the local government 
is ( )1 2R w L L= + . 
 
The model includes three agents, the political leadership, the labor union and an interest 
group. We do not explicitly model the internal political process of the government, but 
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assume well-defined preferences defined over activity levels in the two sectors. For 
analytical tractability we assume that the political leadership has Cobb Douglas 
preferences, 11 2V vL L
α −α= , where α can be interpreted as the relative weight given to 
sector 1. The interest group is best seen as representing the users of the public services 
produced in sector 1. The interest group is assumed to have preferences biased in favor 
of sector 1 relative to the government, 11 2G gL L
β −β= , and β>α. The trade union is 
assumed to be of the rent maximization type, ( ) ( )1 2U L L w r= + − , where the union 
members not employed by the government earns a reservation wage r. 
 
Consider first the case where real activity in sector 1, i.e., the employment level L1, is 
determined in the first stage of the game in an interaction between the political 
leadership of the government and the interest group.3 The political leadership must 
balance the pressure for more spending in the sector where interest groups have a stake 
against spending on the other activities. In the second stage of the game, the 
government bargains with the union over the wage. In the third and final stage of the 
budgetary process, employment in sector 2 is given residually by the budget constraint, 
i.e. 
2 1
RL L
w
= − .                          (1) 
 
To solve the model we start by examining the wage bargaining outcome conditional on 
the activity level in sector 1. The bargaining outcome is illustrated by the Nash 
bargaining solution. When a dispute implies that L1 = L2 = 0, the Nash maximand reads 
( ) ( )( )( )1U 11 2 1 2vL L L L w rη −ηα −αΩ = + − ,             (2) 
where η is the bargaining power of the government. Utilizing (1), some manipulation 
gives the bargained wage 
( ) ( ) 1
1w r
1 1 rL R
−αη= η −α + −η .              (3) 
The wage is equal to the reservation wage if the union has no bargaining power (η = 1), 
                                                 
3 Babcock et al. (1997) and Falch (2001) pursue the stylized idea that employment is determined prior to 
wages in the public sector. 
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while w = R/L1 (and L2 = 0) if the government has no bargaining power (η = 0). The 
wage depends negatively on the employment level in sector 1 decided prior to the wage 
bargain.  
 
While utilizing the Nash bargaining solution is the usual modeling strategy in the wage 
bargaining literature, there is no uniform tradition of how to formally modeling interest 
group influence.4 A simple approach, pursued by, e.g., Kalseth and Rattsø (1998), is to 
assume that the outcome of the interaction between one interest group and a political 
entity is a weighted average of the most preferred outcome of the two, where the 
bargaining power determines the weights. We will show that this may be the outcome of 
a Nash bargaining game. If one is willing to assume that a dispute between the interest 
group and the political leadership in the first stage of the game implies that L1 = 0, the 
Nash–maximand reads 
( ) ( )1G 1 11 2 1 2vL L gL Lγ −γα −α β −βΩ = ,               (4)  
where γ is the bargaining power of the government in the bargain over the activity level 
in sector 1. Maximizing (4), subjected to (1) and (3), gives 
( )( )1 RL 1r= γα + − γ β                (5) 
Notice that employment level in sector 1 is a weighted average of the preferred 
employment levels for the interest group and the political entity, αR/r and βR/r, 
respectively, with the respective bargaining powers γ and (1-γ) as weights. Thus, under 
the assumption that a dispute implies zero activity in sector 1, the Nash bargaining 
solution gives a formal representation of the idea that the realized activity level is a 
compromise between the optimal levels from the interest group and political entity’s 
point of views. While this is a simple way of describing the bargaining outcome, other 
assumptions regarding the activity level in sector 1 during a dispute, produce a highly 
nonlinear solution of the model.        
         
Inserting  (5) into (3) gives the reduced form wage as 
                                                 
4 For example Mitchell and Munger (1991) discuss different maximizing models of interest group 
influence. 
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( ) ( )( )
1w r
(1 ) 1
−αη= η −α + −η β− γ β−α .             (6) 
It is straightforward to establish that dw/dη < 0 and dw/dγ > 0. While the result that 
higher bargaining power of the employer in the wage bargain (higher η) leads to lower 
wage is a conventional result, the fact that the model predicts a positive relationship 
between wages and the bargaining power of the government in the employment setting 
stage (γ) deserves some explanation. With high γ, the activity level in sector 1 will be 
relatively low, and hence more resources are available to wages and employment in 
sector 2.  Since the wage is increasing in the resources available when the wage 
bargaining takes place, higher bargaining power of the local government in the 
employment setting stage of the model has a positive effect on the bargained wage. The 
important point in this setting is that the interest group and the political leadership differ 
in their preferences over activity levels. If preferences are equal, i.e. α=β, the wage 
outcome is independent of γ. 
 
So far we have implicitly assumed that the bargaining powers of the interest group and 
the union are completely different concepts. In reality, however, the governmental 
bargaining powers in the different stages of the budgetary process are not independent. 
Broadly speaking, a government able to resist interest group pressure is also likely to be 
able to resist large wage demands from unions. To investigate the consequences of the 
fact that η and γ are positively correlated, consider the extreme case when η = γ, and 
denote the bargaining power of the government as political strength.  Now there are two 
effects of increased political strength. First, L1 will be lower, partially increasing the 
wage. Second, the bargaining power of the union decreases, working in the opposite 
direction. It follows from (6) that w = r when γ = 1 and w = r/β when γ = 0. When the 
government has no power, the interest group sets L1 so high that there is very little room 
for increased wage above the reservation wage. The marginal effect is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) 2
2 1 2dw
d (1 ) 1η=γ
β −α − − β−α γ −αγ=γ  γ −α + − γ β− γ β−α 
.                       (7) 
Since the first term of the nominator in (7) is positive, the effect of increased political 
strength can be positive. It can be shown that the marginal effect is positive if 
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( ) ( ) ( )
( )*
1β−α − −α β β−αγ < γ = α β−α                                                                                 (8) 
Thus, dw/dγ = 0 for γ = γ*,  dw/dγ > 0 if γ < γ*, and dw/dγ < 0 if γ > γ*.  Hence, the 
effect of increased political strength is approximately inverse U–shaped. Again, the 
possibility of a positive effect of γ will only occur when the interest group and the 
political entity have diverging preferences over activity levels in the two sectors. To see 
this, consider the case with α = β. Now the marginal effect of γ is always negative since 
γ* is zero in this case. As the other extreme, if β = 1, ( )* 11 1 −γ = − −α α . 
 
Next, we compare the results from this model with the case where wages are determined 
prior to employment in the interest group sector. As above, L2 is determined residually 
by the budget constraint in the final stage. Then the bargaining outcome is given by 
1w r= η .                 (9) 
The wage mark-up above the reservation wage is only a function of the bargaining 
power of the government in the wage bargain. If η is positively related to political 
strength, the bargained wage is always negatively related to political strength in this 
case.  
 
The conclusion from the analysis so far is that the effect of political strength on wages 
depends crucially on the order of moves in the budgetary process. If wages are 
determined prior to (after) employment in the interest group sector, an ambiguous 
(negative) association arises between local public sector wages and political strength. 
While the models deliver interesting testable implications, we would ideally like to 
model the bargaining power parameters more explicitly as functions of observable 
variables in order to further discriminate between the main models. Since the theoretical 
setup above is limited in this direction, we now relax the assumption that the political 
leadership has the full responsibility and control in both the formulation and 
implementation of budgeting and wage bargaining decisions. A more realistic 
description of government institutions is that the administration also influences the 
budgeting and wage bargaining processes. First, in most cases the negotiations with the 
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unions on wage issues is delegated to the chief executive in the local government. This 
suggests that the competence and power of the chief executive may be a better proxy for 
employer bargaining power in the wage determination stage than political strength. 
Second, a powerful and competent chief executive may be a necessary condition for a 
strong political leadership to implement its first-best outcomes in the budgetary process.  
 
Consider first what happens if we allow for separate administrative strength in the 
model where employment in the interest group sector is determined prior to wage 
bargaining. As formally shown in Appendix A, in the limit, when political strength is 
only relevant in the employment setting stage, there is an unambiguous positive 
relationship between wages and political strength, while there is an inverse relationship 
between wages and administrative strength. Further, the difference between the effect of 
administrative and political strength is reduced when the political and administrative 
leadership are both involved in the wage setting stage.  
 
It is important to notice that a reversion of the order of moves in the budgetary game, 
with wages bargained prior to the employment determination, implies that both the 
effect of administrative and political strength are negative. 
 
A final question concerns repeated interaction between the bargaining parties. While a 
formal treatment of repeated play between three actors is beyond the scope of the 
present paper, we discuss informally how this would affect our model. An important 
legal constraint in many countries, including Norway, is a requirement of a balanced 
budget, i.e., the government cannot use overspending and deficits strategically. Given 
that the government has limited local fiscal instruments, and that higher local wages 
does not influence the size of the budget, the budget should be seen as exogenous in 
each period. The relevant question each period is then how to allocate the exogenous 
local budget, and which variables that are perceived as exogenous by the actors 
involved at each decision stage. The flexibility of service production in sector 1 
relatively to wages is crucial for this issue. Changing or restructuring important public 
services usually requires long preparation processes, involving many interests and 
political controversies. On the other hand, wage changes usually involve only actors 
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within the local government, and may to some extent be viewed as an internal issue of 
personal policy. This suggests that the model where employment in sector 1 is 
considered as exogenous in the wage bargain may be a realistic description also in a 
setting with repeated interaction between the actors involved.  
 
To sum up: The multistage budgeting model implies that the effect of political strength 
on local wages depends crucially on the order of moves in the budgetary process. The 
model implies that public sector wages may be positively related to political strength if 
employment in sectors where interest groups have a stake is determined prior to the 
wage bargaining. Further, higher administrative strength may reduce wages if the 
administrative leadership is relatively more involved in the wage setting process than 
the political leadership. On the other hand, if employment in all sectors is determined 
after the wage bargain, the effect of both political and administrative strength on local 
wages is negative. 
 
 
3. Empirical implementation 
 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between economic outcomes and political 
variables is easily criticized since theoretical variables such as political strength are 
very difficult to operationalize and measure. Proposed measures of political strength are 
likely to be correlated with other characteristics of governments such as size, historical 
traditions, demographic composition etc.  To the extent that such characteristics are 
excluded from our analysis, significant statistical relationships between wages and 
measures of political strength may be spurious. While the possibility of spurious effects 
is impossible to remove completely, we believe that our empirical strategy and data is 
particularly suitable to reduce the problem. First, we specify below a number of 
variables intended to measure political strength, and we investigate whether the results 
are robust across the different measures. Second, since we utilize a matched employee-
employer panel data set for several years, we can in principle control for both 
unmeasured time-invariant individual characteristics of the employees and unmeasured 
time-invariant community characteristics by including both fixed individual and local 
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government effects in the estimated wage equations.  
 
While political variables may be important in shaping pay in the local public sector, an 
empirical wage model must include the basic economic forces driving the wages as the 
fiscal situation and local labor market conditions. In the following, we discuss both the 
political, administrative and economic variables included in the model.  
 
3.1. The dependent variable 
We utilize a unique data set provided by the Central Organization of Local 
Governments in Norway (KS). The data set covers all municipal employees in Norway 
from 1986-1998, except teachers. A major change in the wage-setting system emerged 
in 1990. From then on, the national wage contracts gave the local governments a lot 
more freedom to set their own wages.5 In order to avoid complicated issues regarding 
changes in wage formation, the 1980s are not included in the analysis, and our measure 
of administrative strength described below restricts the sample period to 1991–1998.6 
The data covers employees working above 20 percent of a full–time equivalent position 
in the welfare services provided by municipalities as of October 1 each year. The 
sample consists of 452 municipalities, excluding the capital of Oslo because the 
institutional setup differs.7  
 
Table 1 presents the development in aggregate real wages and in different measures of 
wage differentials. The average real wage is almost constant until it starts to rise in 
1996. The unconditional standard deviation of the wage is fairly constant over the 
period. The main part of the variation is within local governments, with smaller 
variation across local governments. This must be seen as a result of a relatively 
centralized wage setting system. There has historically been little geographical variation 
in public sector wages. In the last two columns in Table 1 we show the standard 
deviation in wages across local governments calculated using the coefficients on 
                                                 
5 Falch and Strøm (2001) provide an analysis of the regime shift in 1990. 
6 The effect of political strength in models excluding administrative strength does only marginally depend 
on whether the sample starts in 1990 or 1991.  
7 Sources in Norwegian describing different wage setting institutional features are available from the 
authors on request. 
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municipal dummy variables from year–specific regressions of individual wages against 
measured individual characteristics. This measure shows that wage differences across 
municipalities conditional on observable individual characteristics increased slightly 
during the empirical period. In the empirical work below we investigate further whether 
these wage differences are related to political and administrative factors. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The advantage by using individual data for analyzing political behavior is that one can 
condition on individual characteristics. In the model we include sex-specific categorical 
variables for education, age, and working time. The variables used are defined in more 
detail in Appendix B, which also presents some descriptive statistics. 
 
3.2. Political variables 
As to the operationalization of political strength, it is important to discuss in some detail 
the political institutions. The Norwegian local governments have multi-party 
proportional representation in a local council, with election every fourth year. The local 
council does not work as a parliament system establishing a ‘cabinet’, but instead elects 
an executive board among the members of the council. The executive board has 
proportional representation of the political parties. The local council also elects the 
major and the deputy major. Within this setup, we define several measures of political 
strength based on the composition of the local council.8  
 
Our first measure of political strength is related to the political fragmentation in the 
local council. Falch and Rattsø (1999) and Tovmo and Falch (2002) find a strong 
impact of political fragmentation on local government behavior. The fragmentation is 
represented by an Herfindahl index defined as 
P
2
p
p 1
HERF SH
=
= ∑                  
where SHp is the share of representatives from party p in the local council and P is the 
                                                 
8 The composition of the local council and the executive board are very similar due to the proportional 
representation in the executive board, but only information about the local council are regularly collected. 
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number of parties. This index is inversely related to party fragmentation, as it is equal to 
1/P if the seats in the local council are equally distributed among the parties and equal 
to unity if all seats are held by one party.  It is likely that a more fragmented local 
council increases the number of possible outcomes in the budgeting process and hence 
creates more room for lobbying by interest groups. This suggests that the Herfindahl 
index is positively correlated with political strength.  
 
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) investigate the relationship between two different 
measures of fragmentation, the number of spending ministers and the number of 
political parties in a coalition, and fiscal performance in the OECD countries. The 
number of spending ministers is not relevant for the institutional setting of the 
Norwegian local governments. But the number of political parties in the cabinet is a 
simpler measure of fragmentation than the Herfindahl index presented above. 
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) find that increased number of political parties in a 
coalition increases public expenditures. In the Norwegian context, the number of parties 
in the local council is a good approximation to the number of parties in a coalition since 
most parties are represented in the executive board. To facilitate interpretation and 
comparison with other studies, we use the inverse of the number of political parties in 
the local council, as our second measure of political strength. 
 
Another set of variables intended to characterize the political basis of the political 
leadership is suggested by Kalseth and Rattsø (1998) and related to the index proposed 
by Roubini and Sachs (1989). They assume that a one-party majority behind the mayor 
and deputy mayor represents a strong leadership, while, at the other extreme, a coalition 
of parties without a majority behind the mayor and deputy mayor constitute a weak 
political leadership. Based on this reasoning we define four dummy variables 
corresponding to the following political configurations: Minority coalition, one party 
minority, majority coalition, and one party majority. According to this classification, 
minority coalition represents the weakest government, while one party majority 
represents the strongest government.  
 
Our last measure of political strength is the share of representatives in the local council 
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reelected. It is expected that reelected representatives have better knowledge of the 
political system and are more able to handle pressure from interest groups.9  
 
While the above variables are intended to characterize the ability of the political 
leadership to oppose pressure from interest groups, it is commonly argued that political 
ideology is an important force in shaping economic outcomes. In our setting, political 
ideology may influence wages through two mechanisms. First, if socialist parties on 
pure ideological grounds prefer a higher employment share in the interest group sector 
than conservative parties, wage responses may be driven both by interest group pressure 
and political ideology. Within our theoretical model, this means that for a given level of 
government strength, and interest group preferences, a conservative government will 
lead to higher wages than a socialist government, as more money are left for the 
bargaining table in this case. The second possible link between political ideology and 
wage determination in the Norwegian local public sector is the close relationship 
between the largest trade union (Norsk kommuneforbund) and the Labor party and other 
smaller socialist parties. Thus, the union bargaining power in the wage bargaining could 
be positively related to the strength of the socialist parties in the local council, leading 
to positive association between wages and the political power of the socialist parties. 
Consistent with this view, Strøm (1995) finds that wages of lower skilled workers in 
Norwegian local governments are positively related to the share of socialist parties in 
the local council. Although our ambition is not primarily to discriminate empirically 
between these two hypotheses, both mechanisms suggest the importance of controlling 
separately for political ideology in addition to political strength. Thus, we include the 
share of members in the local council representing the non-socialist parties in the 
model.  
 
                                                 
9 Zax (1990) proposes that another measure of the political and institutional structure of the local councils 
may be important for the wage and employment levels. Reform municipal governments, characterized by 
nonpartisan, at-large councils and professional city manager, may yield higher wages and employment 
because the influence of neighborhood and partisan constituencies is reduced. In Norway, all seats in the 
local councils are elected at-large, the waste majority of the representatives represent national political 
parties in almost all local governments, and all local governments’ employs a Chief executive (expect the 
capital of Oslo which is excluded from the analysis). 
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3.3. Administrative strength 
To our knowledge, measures of administrative strength have not been used in models of 
governmental behavior.10 We propose that the tenure of the Chief executive is 
correlated with administrative strength. The Chief executive is responsible for the 
administrative tasks, and is obligated to make proposals to the executive board on all 
major political issues as budgetary issues and structural issues. A Chief executive with 
much experience is likely to know more about the behavior of the parties involved in 
the budgeting process and may help a strong political leadership to reach its goals. 
Likewise, an experienced Chief executive is likely to represent a tougher opposition to 
the union wage demands than an inexperienced Chief executive. An important caveat, 
however, is that most of the Chief executive’s are employed on regular contracts, 
implying that they cannot easily be fired if they turn out to perform badly.  
 
In our data, we can identify a single Chief executive in most of the observations of the 
local governments. In 9 percent of the observations, however, we observe several 
employees with leading administrative positions. The latter group contains mainly the 
largest local governments as it includes all local governments with more than 60 000 
inhabitants. In such local governments there typically exists a leader group, and with 
our data it is impossible to single out the Chief executive due to incomplete data. In 
these cases we use the mean tenure of the individuals in the leader group as our measure 
of administrative strength. 
 
We have no information about the Chief executive’s (or the other employees) before 
1986, and the existing information of the positions in 1986 is poor. Since it is not 
satisfactory to use the number of years as a Chief executive after 1987 as tenure, we 
simply calculate a dummy variable, which is equal to unity if the Chief executive has 
                                                 
10 Notice, however, that some papers have investigated the wage effect of having a city manager versus a 
mayor or council government, see for example Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975), Edwards and Edwards 
(1982) and Gyourko and Tracy (1991). The hypothesis in Ehrenberg and Goldstein (1975) is lower 
wages under a city manager because “city managers may be more efficient negotiators than elected 
mayors or commissioners, because of managers’ professional training or the different political pressure 
they face” (p. 228).  The typical finding, however, including Ehrenberg and Smith (1975), is a positive 
effect of city managers on the wages of public sector employees. On the other hand, Edwards and 
Edwards (1982) find that the impact of unionism on wages is higher in cities that do not employ a city 
manager.  
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been a Chief executive in at least five years and zero otherwise. In order to use a 
breakpoint of five years, we have to reduce the sample period to 1991-1998. To control 
for other characteristics of the Chief executive’s, we also include in the model a dummy 
variable equal to unity if the Chief executive is without tertiary education and a dummy 
variable equal to unity if the Chief executive is below 40 years of age, see Table 3 
below for descriptive statistics.11  
 
Table 2 reports the means of the measures of political and administrative strength and 
the correlation coefficients between them. The two measures of political fragmentation, 
the Herfindahl index and the number of parties in the local council, are highly 
correlated. They are also highly correlated with the political basis of the political 
leadership measured by the one party majority dummy. The share of the non-socialist 
political parties in the local council is negatively correlated with the other variables 
measuring political strength, while the share of the representatives reelected and the 
measure of administrative strength seems to be uncorrelated with the other variables. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
3.4. Economic variables 
As noted above, in the centralized fiscal system in Norway, the largest part of local 
government income is determined by the national government. It is a tax revenue 
sharing system, with extensive use of central government grants. The sum of the income 
tax, wealth tax, and unconditional grants is included as the local government income 
variable. The real value of income depends on the payroll tax, and the payroll tax rate 
varies between regions and to some extent over time. In the case with labor as the only 
input and exogenous income, the budget constraint of the local government is 
R=w(1+t)L, where t is the actual payroll tax rate which varies both across regions and 
over time and L is the total number of employees. Based on the fact that labor costs are 
                                                 
11In the cases where the tenure variable is based on the leader group, the age and education variables are 
computed as the share of the group members with age below 40 years, and the share with tertiary 
education, respectively. The fact that the Chief executive and other administrative leaders are not elected, 
but have permanent job contracts, imply that they do not have incentives to act strategically towards the 
union or the interest group for reelection or job security purposes. Thus, it seems safe to consider our 
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the major expenditure component, we use R/(1+t) as our local government income 
measure. 
 
As a measure of the local labor market conditions, we include the local unemployment 
rate, expecting that higher unemployment decreases the expected value of the outside 
option of the employees and thereby tends to reduce the wage. In addition, the model 
includes several other variables that to some extent may characterize the local labor 
market; the population size, variables describing population composition, and municipal 
fixed effects. Definitions and summary statistics are provided in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
In this section we first present the estimated effects of the variables intended to measure 
political and administrative strength in linear models. Thereafter we investigate possible 
nonlinear effects and an interaction effect between political and administrative strength.  
 
The model specification includes local government specific effects to control for 
potential omitted time-invariant variables at the local government level. But because the 
composition of the local government employees typically changes over time, fixed local 
government effects will not fully control for unobserved time-invariant individual 
characteristics of the employees. Thus, we also include fixed individual effects in the 
model. While it is straightforward to estimate linear models with one set of fixed effects 
by using deviations from individual means for each variable, it is not straightforward to 
include two sets of fixed effects because only one set of fixed effects can be removed by 
differencing the model, see Abowd et al. (1999). Because all types of fixed effects in 
principle can be handled by including dummy variables in the model, this is a high-
dimensionality problem. Our approach to deal with this problem is to utilize that with 
fixed individual effects included, local government specific effects are solely identified 
                                                                                                                                               
proposed measure of administrative strength as an exogenous variable in the model.  
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by employees moving between different local governments in the sample period. By 
technically treating an individual moving from one municipality to another municipality 
as different individuals when being employed in the two municipalities, the model is 
straightforward to estimate. A similar approach is proposed by Goux and Maurin 
(1999). The method implies that we not only condition on all individual and local 
government characteristics that are constant over time, but we also condition on the 
interaction between these unobserved characteristics. In this way, the model allows the 
unobserved individual characteristics to have different effects in different local 
governments. Thus, the models include a full set of individual and local government 
effects and the interaction between these fixed effects. 
 
Since our focus is on political and administrative strength, we only report the effect of 
these variables in the following tables. For completeness, we report the results for all 
variables in one version of the model in Appendix Table B. It appears that there is a 
positive effect of local government income and population size as expected, although 
the effect of unemployment is positive contrary to our hypothesis.12 The effect of the 
individual characteristics are as expected, but in interpreting the effects one has to keep 
in mind that individual specific effects are included in the model, making the 
coefficients small due to limited within-group variation in the variables. 
 
4.1. The role of political strength 
Columns (1)-(5) in Table 4 present the wage effect of each of the proposed political 
variables when they are included separately. The estimated effects of political strength 
are significantly positive at one percent level in all cases except that the wage seems to 
be lower under one party minority (the mayor and the deputy mayor are from the same 
political party, and this party is in minority) than under a coalition minority. To 
illustrate the numerical effects, consider the effect of the Herfindahl index for party 
                                                 
12 It is not obvious how to interpret the positive unemployment effect in the model with a full set of fixed 
effects, in particular since the variation in unemployment rate through time is very similar across the local 
governments. When estimating the model without fixed effects (not reported), the effect of 
unemployment is negative. This picture is consistent with estimated regional wage equations for Norway 
where a negative unemployment effect is found only for non-unionized male workers [Barth et al. 
(2002)]. It is also consistent with earlier studies of local public wages in Norway reporting positive 
unemployment effects in fixed effects specifications [Strøm (1995)].  
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fragmentation in the local council.  The model in column (1) indicates that reduced 
fragmentation of two standard deviations increases the wage by 0.13 percent. The effect 
is small, which partly reflects that the wage determination in the Norwegian local 
governments still is very centralized, and partly is a result of including local 
government specific effects in the model. When the fixed local government effects are 
excluded (only fixed individual effects are included), the effect is almost three times 
larger. In addition to the positive association between wages and political strength, the 
results indicate a negative relationship between wages and the share of non-socialist 
representatives in the local council. This last result is consistent with the findings of 
Strøm (1995) and may indicate that non-socialists represent a tougher opposition to 
wage demands from the union than socialist parties.13 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
The measure of administrative strength,  a dummy variable indicating if the tenure of 
the Chief executive is at least five years, has a significantly negative effect on wages. 
This is in accordance with the hypothesis that the Chief executive plays a larger role in 
the wage bargaining than in the interaction with the interest groups and that an 
experienced Chief executive is more able to oppose wage pressure than an 
inexperienced Chief executive. Notice that the numerical effect of political strength is 
independent of whether the measure of administrative strength is included in the model. 
 
For the sake of completeness we also report in column (6) the results when all measures 
of political strength are included in the same model. As expected, the results are rather 
mixed, which reflect the fact that most of the measures of political strength are highly 
correlated and accordingly the results in these specifications must be interpreted with 
care. The most robust result seems to be that the local wages is positively related to the 
Herfindahl index of party fragmentation since the effect of this variable is unaffected by 
                                                 
13 This variable is included as a continuous variable following Strøm (1995). When a dummy variable 
indicating if conservative parties are in majority is included together with the original variable, the effect 
of both variables are negative, but only the continuous variable is significant at ten percent level. We also 
tested whether the effect of the non-socialist share depends on whether one single non-socialist party was 
in majority. We did not find any such interaction effects.  
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the inclusion of the other measures of political strength. The same is true for 
administrative strength because this variable is not highly correlated with the measures 
of political strength as seen in Table 2. 
 
So far, our findings that wages are positively related to political strength and inversely 
related to administrative strength is consistent with the model where real activity in the 
interest group sector is decided prior to wage bargaining. A further prediction from the 
theoretical model in section 2 is that the effect of political strength is inverse U–shaped. 
To investigate this hypothesis, we first add the square of each of the political strength 
variables to the model, and the results are presented in Table 5.14 The results are mixed, 
which is not surprising because several of the measures of political strength have 
limited within local government variation. Typically the within variation, covering three 
different election terms, accounts for only about 10 percent of the overall variation. The 
only exception is the share of reelected representatives in the local council where the 
within and between variation is about the same size. Interestingly, for this variable the 
relationship is significantly inverse U–shaped, with the largest effect one standard 
deviation above mean.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
A less rigid interpretation of the non-linearity implied by the theoretical model is that 
the numerical size of the wage effect of a marginal increase in political strength is larger 
for relatively low values of political strength than for relatively high values of political 
strength. To investigate this hypothesis empirically, we split the sample in order to 
isolate the marginal effects under different degrees of political strength. In the lower 
end, we single out local governments with political strength of the relevant measure 
below the overall mean in all sample years, and in the upper end we single out local 
governments with political strength of the relevant measure above mean in every 
sample year. With such a split of the sample, the effect of party fragmentation measured 
by the Herfindahl index is four times higher than the average effect under weak political 
                                                 
14 The variable measuring the political basis of the political leadership are not included because higher 
order values of dummy variables are equal to the dummy variables themselves. 
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leadership, and weakly negative under strong political leadership (both subsamples 
include about 30 percent of the observations). The same qualitative result applies for the 
inverse of the number of political parties in the local council. Overall, the evidence 
therefore indicates that the relationship between wages and political strength is 
consistent with the predictions from the theoretical model.15 
 
The theoretical model also implies that the effect of political strength depends 
negatively on the size of administrative strength.16 In the models in Table 6 interaction 
terms between the measures of political and administrative strength are included. For 
party fragmentation, the interaction effect is significantly negative, indicating that 
administrative strength mainly has a negative effect under strong political leaderships. 
Within the theoretical model above, the interpretation is that a strong political 
leadership is able to resist interest group pressure and thereby leave more resources to 
be shared in the wage bargaining. This increases the union’s wage demand, and the 
demand will be met to a greater extent under a weak administration than a strong 
administration. For the other measures of political strength, the results are mixed.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
 
5. Concluding comments. 
 
A common hypothesis in the empirical literature on public finance is that a strong 
political leadership reduces government spending since a more powerful political entity 
is less vulnerable to interest group pressure than a weak one. We have investigated the 
relationship between public sector wages and political strength by estimating wage 
equations using individual data on employees in the Norwegian local governments in 
the period 1991-1998. The evidence suggests that the strength of the political 
                                                 
15 This is also confirmed by models excluding all the fixed effects. In such models, the effect of party 
fragmentation and the number of political parties are inverse U–shaped. 
16 The model also predicts that the effect of administrative strength is nonlinear. But because our measure 
of administrative strength is a dummy variable, it is impossible to include higher order values of 
administrative strength in the model. 
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leadership, measured in different ways, is positively related to public sector wages. This 
conclusion is robust across a number of empirical specifications including both fixed 
local government and fixed individual effects. The evidence also indicates that 
administrative strength has a negative effect on the local public wages. 
 
The positive effect of political strength found is surprising in light of the existing 
literature clearly indicating that a strong political leadership is better able to hold down 
pressure for overspending than a weak one. However, while the existing literature 
considers broad measure of economic outcomes as total expenditures and budget 
deficits, wages are only a part of the budget. In practice, decisions on the different 
components of public expenditure are determined at different points in time. Our 
evidence is consistent with a model where employment in sectors where interest groups 
have a stake is determined prior to wage bargaining. A strong political leadership will 
hold down the activity level in the interest group sector while leaving more money to be 
shared in the wage bargain. Based on the argument that the strength of the 
administrative leadership is relatively more important in personnel policy and wage 
negotiations, it is reasonable that the effect on wages of administrative and political 
strength have opposite signs. 
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Appendix A. The role of administrative strength 
The purpose of this appendix is to extend the theoretical model in the main text to allow 
for influence from the administrative leadership. Consider first the determination of real 
activity in sector 1. The local government bargaining power in the interaction with the 
interest group at this stage can be written ( )P 1 Aγ = ε + − ε , where P is political 
strength, A is administrative strength, and ε is the weight of P. Consider next the wage 
bargaining stage, where representatives from the local government bargains with the 
union. In the Norwegian case, the Chief executive seems to be relatively more engaged, 
compared to the political leadership, in the wage setting stage than in the employment 
determination stage. To illustrate the difference between political and administrative 
strength within this setting, consider the extreme case where η = A. Now it follows 
from (6) that dw/dP > 0, and 
.     
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( ) 2
2 1 A 2 A 1 1 Pdw
dA A 1 1 A P 1 A
 β −α − − β−α −α + ε + −α =  −α + − β− ε + − ε β−α 
                  (A.1) 
To evaluate the effect, consider first the case when ε = 1. Now dw/dA < 0, which 
follows directly from the fact that the bargaining powers γ and η are completely 
separated. Consider then the case when ε = 0. Now γ = η, the marginal effect can be of 
either sign, and the model is equal to the model in Section 2. Thus, given that ε < 1, the 
effect of A will be smaller than the effect of P. 
 
It is possible to show that the marginal effect of political strength depends on the level 
of administrative strength. An evaluation of the interaction effect, however, is easiest 
using a simulation experiment. Figure A1 presents the marginal effect of P for different 
values of A. 
 
Figure A1 about here 
 
From Figure A1 it is clear that the marginal effect of political strength is larger for low 
values of A than for high values of A.  Consider a strong political leadership that hold 
down employment in sector 1 and leave much to be shared in the wage bargain. With a 
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weak administration the wage will be high, while with a strong administration, the wage 
will be low. Obviously, the effect of political strength depends negatively on 
administrative strength.  
 
 
Appendix B. Data appendix 
Observations of individuals working less than 20 percent of a full-time equivalent 
position are excluded from the sample. The following variables are used in the analysis. 
A more detailed definition of the variables is available upon request. 
 
Dependent variable. The real full–time equivalent monthly wage level, excess of 
supplement pay due to for example overtime and night work. The mean of the variable 
in 1998_NOK is 16,108, with standard deviation 2,577. Source is the Federation of 
Local Governments.  
 
Individual characteristics. Source is the Federation of Local Governments (mean values 
in parentheses). 
– Education categories  
– Master degree (0.02) 
 – Engineer (0.02) 
 – Education in business and administration (0.01) 
 – College education (0.45) 
 – High school education or less (0.42) 
 – Education missing (0.08) 
– Age categories  
– Age up to 19 years (0.002) 
 – Age 20–24 years (0.02) 
 – Age 25–29 years (0.08) 
 – Age 30–39 years (0.26) 
 – Age 40–49 years (0.31) 
 – Age 50–59 years (0.22) 
 – Age above 60 years (0.10) 
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– Man (22.8) 
– Working less than 50 percent of full time (0.12) 
– Working less than full time but at least 50 percent of full time (0.44) 
 
Local government characteristics. Source is the Norwegian Social Data Services. 
Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 3 in the main 
text. 
 
Administrative characteristics. Source is the Federation of Local Governments. 
Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 3 in the main 
text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. Wages and wage dispersion 
  Unconditional statistics Statistics conditional on individual 
characteristics 
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 Observations Mean  
real wage1 
Std. dev.  
log wage 
Std. dev. log wage 
within local gov. 
Std. dev. log wage 
across local gov.2 
1990 149,084 15,886 0.144 0.095 0.079 
1991 162,965 15,577 0.141 0.094 0.078 
1992 173,781 15,563 0.146 0.099 0.085 
1993 185,581 15,701 0.149 0.100 0.084 
1994 192,063 15,725 0.148 0.100 0.083 
1995 200,723 15,752 0.147 0.101 0.081 
1996 206,390 16,489 0.142 0.100 0.078 
1997 203,207 16,439 0.143 0.102 0.075 
1998 208,727 17,572 0.133 0.094 0.108 
1 1998–NOK, deflated by the consumer price index (NOK/Euro ≈ 8). 2 Calculated by the method 
suggested by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997). 
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Table 2. Mean values and correlation coefficients for the variables measuring political 
and administrative strength 
 Mean
(std)
HERF PC POL_
2 
POL_
3 
POL_
4 
RE CON TEN
Herfindahl index for party fragmentation in 
the local council  (HERF) 
0.25 
(0.06)
 1.00 - - - - - - - 
The inverse of the number of political 
parties in the local council (PC) 
0.15 
(0.04)
 0.68  1.00 - - - - - - 
One party minority behind the mayor and 
the deputy mayor (POL_2) 
0.22 
(0.42)
 0.25  0.05  1.00 - - - - - 
Majority coalition in the local council  
(POL_3) 
0.20 
(0.40)
 0.09  0.17 -0.27  1.00 - - - - 
One party majority in the local council  
(POL_4) 
0.08 
(0.27)
 0.61  0.35 -0.15 -0.15  1.00 - - - 
The share of the representatives in the local 
council reelected (RE) 
0.38 
(0.09)
-0.02 -0.11  0.08 -0.02 -0.04 1.00 - - 
The share of the representatives in the local 
council from non-socialist parties  (CON) 
0.58 
(0.14)
-0.48 -0.11 -0.26  0.08  0.40 -0.04  1.00 - 
Chief executive’s tenure is at least five 
years (TEN) 
0.62 
(0.49)
-0.04 0.04 -0.04  0.06  0.01  0.06 -0.02  1.00
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Table 3. Definitions and descriptive statistics for local government and administrative 
characteristics included in the empirical model. 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation
Local government characteristics 
    income Real yearly exogenous income per capita in 1998–NOK for the 
local government. Income includes the sum of general grant 
and tax revenue sharing, and is corrected for the payroll tax 
rate as described in the main text 
16,146 4,257 
   unemployment Unemployment rate in the local government. 4.46 1.92 
   population Population size 35,103 52,493 
   share pre–school The share of the population below 7 years of age. 0.10 0.01 
   share youth The share of the population between 7 and 15 years of age 0.11 0.01 
   share elderly The share of the population above 80 years of age 0.04 0.01 
Administrative characteristics 
   Low education The chief executive does not have tertiary education 0.08 - 
   Age below 40 The chief executive is below 40 of age 0.47 - 
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Table 4. The effects of political and administrative strength. Dependent variable is the 
log of the wage 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Herfindahl index for party fragmentation in 
the local council 
 0.010 
(7.38) 
   -    -    -    -  0.010 
(5.25) 
The inverse of the number of political parties 
in the local council 
   -  0.007 
(3.19) 
   -    -    -  0.001 
(0.40) 
One party majority in the local council    -    -  0.0008 
(3.67) 
   -    - -0.0001 
(0.31) 
Majority coalition in the local council    -    -  0.0001 
(0.45) 
   -    - -0.0003 
(2.31) 
One party minority behind the mayor and the 
deputy mayor 
   -    - -0.0006 
(4.64) 
   -    - -0.0008 
(6.04) 
The share of the representatives in the local 
council reelected 
   -    -    -  0.002 
(4.99) 
   -  0.002 
(4.81) 
The share of the representatives in the local 
council from non-socialist parties 
   -    -    -    - -0.002 
(2.17) 
 0.001 
(0.63) 
Chief executive’s tenure is at least five years -0.0005 
(6.13) 
-0.0005 
(6.04) 
-0.0005 
(6.18) 
-0.0005 
(6.39) 
-0.0005 
(6.08) 
-0.0005 
(6.39) 
       
Interacted individual and local government 
specific effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,522,705 1,522,705 1,522,705 1,522,705 1,522,705 1,522,705 
Equation standard error * 100 3.24078 3.24084 3.24079 3.24082 3.24085 3.24070 
Note: Sample period is 1991-1998. Absolute t-values in parentheses. Year specific effects are included. 
Individual characteristics included are sex–specific effects of education (6 categories), age (7 categories), 
and part time work (2 categories). Local government characteristics included, all at logarithmic form, are 
local government income, unemployment, the population size, and the shares of the population below 7 
years of age, 7-15 years of age and above 80 years of age. In addition, the models include a dummy 
variable for whether the Chief Executive does not have tertiary education and a dummy variable for 
whether the Chief Executive is below 40 years of age. 
 
Table 5. Nonlinear effects of political strength. Dependent variable is the log of the 
wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Measure of political strength 
 Herfindahl index 
for party 
fragmentation in 
the local council
The inverse of the 
number of political 
parties in the local 
council 
The share of the 
representatives 
in the local 
council reelected 
The share of the 
representatives in 
the local council 
from non-socialist 
parties 
Political strength 0.012 
(2.52) 
-0.002 
(0.32) 
0.018 
(9.41) 
-0.001 
(0.14) 
Political strength squared -0.004 
(0.53) 
0.022 
(1.50) 
-0.020 
(8.46) 
-0.001 
(0.42) 
Chief executive’s tenure is at least 
five years 
-0.0005 
(6.13) 
-0.0005 
(6.02) 
-0.0005 
(5.89) 
-0.0005 
(6.07) 
     
Interacted individual and local 
government specific effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,522,705 1,522,705 1,522,705 1,522,705 
Equation standard error * 100 3.24078 3.24084 3.24072 3.24085 
Note: Sample period is 1991–1998. Absolute t-values in parentheses. The specifications of the models are 
equal to the models in Table 3 except as indicated. 
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Table 6. Interaction between political and administrative strength. Dependent variable is 
the log of the wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Measure of 
political 
strength 
    
 Herfindahl 
index for 
party 
fragmentation 
in the local 
council 
The inverse 
of the 
number of 
political 
parties in the 
local council
The share of 
the 
representatives 
in the local 
council 
reelected 
The share of the 
representatives 
in the local 
council from 
non-socialist 
parties 
The 
political 
basis of the 
mayor and 
deputy 
mayor 
Political strength 0.011 
(7.63) 
0.008 
(3.12) 
0.0004 
(0.53) 
-0.001 
(0.73) 
- 
One party majority in the local 
council (POL__4) 
-   - 0.0010 
(3.30) 
Majority coalition in the local 
council (POL_3) 
- -  - -0.0002 
(0.91) 
One party minority behind the 
mayor and the deputy mayor 
(POL_2) 
- -  - -0.0002 
(0.88) 
Chief executive’s tenure is at least 
five years (TEN) 
0.0002 
(0.56) 
-0.0004 
(1.28) 
-0.0016 
(5.10) 
0.0005 
(1.58) 
-0.0004 
(3.93) 
Interaction between political 
strenght and TEN 
-0.003 
(2.31) 
-0.0009 
(0.50) 
0.0029 
(3.60) 
-0.0018 
(3.15)- 
- 
POL_4*TEN - -  - -0.0002 
(0.73) 
POL_3*TEN - -  - 0.0004 
(2.06) 
POL_2*TEN - -  - -0.0006 
(3.32) 
      
Interacted individual and local 
government  
specific effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,522,705 1,522,705 1,522,705 1,522,705 1,522,705 
Equation standard error * 100 3.24072 3.24084 3.24076 3.24081 3.24084 
Note: Sample period is 1991–1998. Absolute t-values in parentheses. The specifications of the models are 
equal to the models in Table 3 except as indicated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B. Results of full model. Dependent variable is the log of monthly full-time 
 2
equivalent wage  
 Men Women 
Individual characteristics   
   Master  0.025 (9.91)  0.026 (10.5) 
   Engineer  0.021 (9.71)  0.035 (6.11) 
   Business and administration  0.033 (12.8)  0.051 (23.3) 
   Bachelor  0.017 (22.9)  0.028 (86.4) 
   Education missing -0.007 (5.00) -0.002 (1.79) 
   High school or less - - 
   Below 20 years of age -0.089 (25.6) -0.125 (88.3) 
   20–24 years of age -0.047 (37.2) -0.079 (129.6) 
   25–29 years of age 0.007 (9.19) -0.023 (49.9) 
   30–39 years of age 0.043 (66.3)  0.015 (38.9) 
   40–49 years of age 0.038 (72.2)  0.017 (56.1) 
   50–59 years of age 0.021 (50.1)  0.012 (49.0) 
   60 years of age or older - - 
   Working less than 50 percent of full time -0.022 (34.4) -0.012 (60.4) 
   Working between 50 and 100 percent of full time -0.010 (27.0) -0.008 (59.2) 
   Working full time - - 
Local government characteristics   
   Log of income  0.005 (6.75) 
   Log of unemployment  0.001 (6.49) 
   Log of population 0.010 (5.52) 
   Log of share pre–school  0.0001 (0.12) 
   Log of share youth -0.005 (4.05) 
   Log of share elderly -0.002 (2.66) 
   Low education of Chief executive -0.0006 (2.79) 
   Age below 40 of Chief executive  0.0002 (1.67) 
   Herfindahl index for party fragmentation in the local council  0.010 (7.38) 
   Chief executive’s tenure is at least five years -0.0005 (6.13) 
Time specific effects  
   1991 - 
   1992  0.003 (22.2) 
   1993  0.011 (80.4) 
   1994  0.014 (94.8) 
   1995  0.020 (118.7) 
   1996  0.068 (376.9) 
   1997  0.068 (308.6) 
   1998  0.141 (515.7) 
  
Interacted individual and local government specific effects Yes 
Observations 1,522,705 
Equation standard error * 100 3.24078 
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Figure A1: The marginal effect of political strength; r = β = 1, α = ε = 0.5 
 
 
 
 
